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Abstract	This	paper	critically	assesses	international	policy	advocacy	on	how	to	resolve	massive	shelter	needs	in	the	developing	world.	It	does	so	by	focusing	on	the	World	Bank	as	a	leader	in	development.	It	argues	that	the	Bank’s	housing	policy	remains	thoroughly	limited	by	its	persistent	commitment	to	neoliberal	and	financialised	policy	practices.	These	put	housing	finance	at	the	centre	of	attempts	to	relieve	shelter	needs	in	the	developing	world	despite	the	dramatic	failures	of	such	an	approach	as	laid	bare	through	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.	The	paper	takes	a	historical	approach	to	examine	the	trajectory	of	World	Bank	housing	policy	and	is	based	on	close	scrutiny	of	a	combination	of	quantitative	and	qualitative	data.	It	concludes	that	an	urgent	need	persists	for	a	decoupling	of	finance	from	housing	in	international	policy	advocacy.		
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‘Providing	housing	for	3	billion	people	by	2030	is	both	a	challenge	and	
an	opportunity.	It	is	not	an	impossible	feat,	but	one	that	can	be	
overcome	if	we	work	together	to	develop	financial	systems	that	will	
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increase	access	to	sustainable	housing	finance	in	the	developing	world’	
(Sixth	Global	Housing	Finance	Conference,	May	28-29	2014,	World	
Bank	Group,	Washington,	DC).	1	
	
Introduction		Massive	shelter	inadequacies	exist	across	the	developing	world.	Over	880	million	people	live	in	slums	in	developing	countries,	up	from	792	million	in	2000	(UN-Habitat,	2015:	7).	This	is	projected	to	double	within	the	decade.	These	dire	shelter	needs	are	well-recognised	in	international	policy	circles,	which	has	been	most	emblematic	with	the	formal	adoption	of	a	‘housing	for	all’	target	(11.1)	as	part	of	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals.2		This	paper	scrutinises	the	policy	paradigm	promoted	by	the	World	Bank	on	how	shelter	inadequacies	in	the	developing	world	should	be	overcome.	It	focuses	on	the	World	Bank	as	a	public	international	financial	institution	that	exercises	a	leadership	role	in	development	discourse	and	policy	practices,	including	on	housing.	More	specifically,	the	paper	investigates	whether	the	dramatic	experience	with	housing	finance	in	subprime	markets	through	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	(GFC)	had	any	substantive	implications	for	World	Bank-promoted	housing	policies	across	the	developing	world.	The	paper	does	so	by	pursuing	a	historical	approach	which	allows	to	demonstrate	how	an	initial	neoliberal	bias	in	Bank	housing	
																																																								1	http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2014/05/28/6th-global-housing-finance-conference.	2	According	to	Target	11.1	there	should	be	‘access	for	all	to	adequate,	safe	and	affordable	housing	and	basic	services’	by	2030	(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11).	
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policies	rapidly	transformed	from	the	1980s	onwards	into	an	agenda	that	put	housing	finance	at	its	centre.	This	shift	accelerated	during	the	1990s	and	2000s.	It	was	impervious	to	increasingly	loud	denunciations	of	World	Bank	policies	in	the	late	1990s	as	well	as	the	extraordinary	events	of	the	GFC	in	the	late	2000s	that	dramatically	exposed	the	shortcomings	of	finance-led	housing	policies.	Since	the	GFC,	the	Bank’s	approach	remains	centrally	organised	around	housing	finance,	and	this	has	more	recently	combined	with	its	advocacy	of	public	private	partnerships	(PPPs)	in	infrastructure	provision,	including	shelter.			Through	its	analysis,	this	paper	contributes	to	a	set	of	intersecting	debates,	including	most	broadly,	on	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	in	development,	the	neoliberalisation	and	financialisation	of	housing	provision,	and	the	nature	of	the	fallout	of	the	GFC	for	policy	paradigms	promoted	by	international	financial	institutions	like	the	World	Bank.	Further,	while	a	literature	on	housing	and	financialisation	is	rapidly	growing	for	the	developed	countries,3	contributions	on	financialisation	and	shelter	provision	in	the	developing	world	remain	scarce.4	This	paper	then	contributes	to	the	latter	debate,	but	does	so	by	deploying	the	Bank’s	approach	to	shelter	as	a	prism	to	examine	trajectories	of	neoliberal	and	financialised	forms	of	housing	policy	in	the	developing	world.	This	focus	means	that	a	full	review	of	the	impact	of	such	policies	across	different	geographical	locations	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	paper,	although	reference	is	made,	where	possible,	to	the	existing	evidence	base.		
																																																								3	See	Aalbers	2015	for	a	review;	Robertson	(2014)	and	Rolnik	(2013).	4	The	exceptions	are	Desai	and	Loftus	(2012)	and	Gryffud	Jones	(2012)	on	financialisation	and	slum	upgrading	programmes,	and	Soederberg	(2014a)	for	a	critical	assessment	of	mortgage	securitisation	in	the	service	of	low-income	housing	in	Mexico.		
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	Before	proceeding,	however,	a	set	of	(preliminary)	issues	need	tackling.	First,	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	in	international	housing	policy	needs	clarifying.	Second,	the	articulation	between	international	housing	and	national	housing	policies	needs	specifying.	And,	third,	the	analysis	needs	to	be	situated	within	the	broader	debates	on	neoliberalism	and	financialisation.				Taking	the	last	issue	first,	Aalbers’	(2017)	entry	in	the	International	Encyclopaedia	of	Geography	(Richardson	et	al.,	2017)	on	the	rapid	proliferation	of	‘financialisation’	across	the	social	sciences	provides	a	useful	analytical	anchor.	Aalbers	(2017:	4)	adopts	a	broad	definition	of	financialisation	as:	‘the	increasing	dominance	of	financial	actors,	markets,	practices,	measurements,	and	narratives,	at	various	scales,	resulting	in	a	structural	transformation	of	economies,	firms	…,	states,	and	households’.	With	this	definition,	he	categorises	the	fast-growing	financialisation	literature	according	to	ten	different	themes,	stretching	from	a	literature	that	understands	financialisation	as	a	‘historically	recurring	process’	signalling	the	decline	of	hegemonic	powers,	to	contributions	critically	examining	the	discursive	shifts	implied	by	the	rapid	proliferation	of	finance	across	various	aspects	of	social,	economic	and	daily	life.			Following	Aalbers’	(2017)	categorisation,	this	paper	sits	across	the	strands	of	the	financialisation	literature	that	focus	on	the	financialisation	of	public	policy	(theme	8)	and,	if	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	financialisation	of	the	public	sector	(theme	7).	For	Aalbers	(2017:	11)	the	idea	of	the	financialisation	of	public	policy	draws	attention	to	the	active	role	played	by	the	state	in	promoting	‘a	movement	away	from	the	
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state	and	into	financial	markets’	the	creation	of	which	has	been	facilitated	by	a	‘combination	of	commodification/privatisation	and	de/re-regulation’.	We	take	this	notion	forward	in	the	study	of	a	public	international	financial	institution,	the	World	Bank,	as	an	enabler	of	financialised	public	policy	through	its	promotion,	specifically,	of	financial	market	development	in	support	of	commodified	housing	provision	in	the	developing	world.			An	interrogation	of	World	Bank	housing	policies	in	the	wake	of	the	GFC	also	needs	to	be	situated	vis-à-vis	the	large	literature	on	neoliberalism	and	the	conceptual	relationship	between	neoliberalism	and	financialisation	to	be	clarified.	Here,	again,	Aalbers	(2017)	is	useful	in	emphasizing	the	interdependence	between	the	two,	with	financialisation	often	promoted	through	a	neoliberal	agenda.5	Fine	and	Saad-Filho	(2016)	pursue	the	idea	of	such	an	interdependence	further.	For	the	authors,	financialisation	captures	‘the	increasing	role	of	globalised	finance	in	ever	more	areas	of	economic	and	social	life’,	yet	it	underpins	and	is	itself	propelled	forward	by	a	neoliberal	system	of	governance.	And	while	there	are	distinctive	features	to	such	a	system	of	governance,	in	particular	its	promotion	of	the	interest	of	private	capital	(and	finance),	neoliberalism	is	not	a	homogenising	force	but	produces	diverse	and	variegated	outcomes.	This	emphasis	on	variegated	forms	and	outcomes	of	neoliberalism	indeed	recurs	in	the	vast	literature	on	the	topic	(see	Peck	et	al.,	2013).	The	literature	also	draws	attention	to	the	discrepancies	between	its	rhetoric,	scholarship	and	policies	in	practices	and	points	to	shifting	and	uneven	
																																																								5	Aalbers	(2017:	12)	adds	that	despite	various	attempts	to	tease	out	strict	causalities	between	the	two	concepts,	‘it	is	hard	to	disentangle	[their]	causal	relationships	for	…	[they]	are	both	so	widely	defined	and	…	part	and	parcel	of	each	other’.		
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relationships	between	these	three	dimensions	of	neoliberalism,	across	topic	and	over	time	(see	Fine	2001;	Bayliss	et	al.,	2011),	capturing	a	theme	that	runs	through	this	paper.			This	brings	us	to	the	two	other	preliminary	issues	identified	above	that	need	clarifying	before	we	can	proceed.	These	relate	to,	on	the	one	hand,	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	in	international	housing	policy	and,	on	the	other,	the	interface	between	international	and	national	housing	policies.	As	discussed	elaborately	below,	the	World	Bank	entered	the	field	of	housing	policy	during	the	1970s.	In	doing	so,	it	joined	a	set	of	international	(and	national)	institutions	that	had	been	intervening	in	housing	policies	in	the	developing	world	since	the	1950s	(Chiodelli,	2016;	Ramsamy,	2006;	Stren,	2014).	The	Bank	rapidly	rose	to	prominence	to	become	the	major	donor	agency	in	the	sector,	disbursing	a	cumulative	amount	of	US$	16	billion	in	loans	to	the	sector	worldwide	over	three	decades	and	positioning	itself	at	the	heart	of	various	international	policy	networks	on	housing	(International	Housing	Coalition,	2008:	3).6	And,	as	aptly	observed	by	Ramsamy	(2006:	78),	while	the	World	Bank	does	not	necessarily	act	as	a	pioneer	in	shifting	approaches	to	housing,	it	‘has	the	power	to	appropriate	key	aspects	of	the	debates,	inflect	them	to	suit	its	own	agendas,	and	endorse	its	positions	such	that	everyone	else	follows	suit	until	a	new	debate	arises’.	Its	hegemonic	role	in	development	discourse,	in	general,	and	international	housing	policy	in	particular,	derives	from	
																																																								6	It	is	telling	that	as	the	United	Nations	(UN)	institutionalised	an	interest	in	shelter	through	the	creation	of	the	United	Centre	for	Human	Settlements	(now	UN-Habitat),	in	1978,	and	successive	UN	declarations	on	housing	(in	1987	through	the	first	Global	Report	on	Human	Settlements,	in	1996	through	Habitat	II	and,	most	recently	through	Habitat	III	in	2016),	its	priorities	on	shelter	remained	closely	aligned	with	World	Bank-identified	priorities	(see	Chiodelli,	2016;	Keivani	and	Werna,	2001;	Pugh,	1995).	
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its	‘manufacture	of	consent	among	actors	at	multiple	scales’	(Ramsamy,	2006:	28).	This	stems	from	its	power	to	alleviate	financing	constraints	through	its	lending	function,	but	this	is	enhanced	by	the	‘knowledge	role’	the	institution	has	formally	crafted	for	itself	over	time	(see	Van	Waeyenberge	and	Fine,	2011).			Further,	the	trajectory	of	Bank	housing	policies	is	determined	by	the	World	Bank’s	own	institutional	reconfigurations.	The	World	Bank	Group	is	a	public	financial	institution,	owned	by	its	member	states,	which	lends	to	both	public	and	private	institutions	through	different	parts	of	its	organisation.	The	public	sector	arms	include	the	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(IBRD)	and	International	Development	Association	(IDA).	These	extend	loans	on	near-market	and	concessional	terms,	respectively,	to	governments	or	under	government	guarantee.	This	contrasts	with	the	activities	of	its	private	sector	arm,	the	International	Finance	Corporation	(IFC),	which	provides	financial	support	directly	to	the	private	sector	(either	through	loans,	equity	stakes	or	technical	assistance).	Traditionally,	the	World	Bank	Group’s	operations	have	focused	on	lending	to	governments	often	to	support	large-scale	projects.	Since	the	1980s,	however,	the	World	Bank	Group	has	been	characterised	by	a	rapid	reconfiguration	away	from	lending	to	the	public	sector,	towards	support	for	the	private	sector	as	the	Bank	became	an	important	sponsor	of	neoliberal	policies	across	the	developing	world	(see	Van	Waeyenberge	et	al.,	2011).	Institutionally,	this	has	reflected	in	the	rapid	rise	of	its	private	sector	arm,	the	IFC,	and	the	increased	mobilisation	of	its	public	sector	lending	facilities	in	support	of	private	sector	activities	(including	through	conditionalities	of	liberalisation,	privatisation	and	deregulation	in	its	lending	programmes).	This	implies	that	increasingly	over	the	last	three	decades	the	World	
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Bank	has	deployed	publically-backed	resources	in	support	of	private	(and	financial)	sector	activity	in	the	developing	world.	In	the	context	of	housing,	this	trend	has	been	particularly	visible	as	the	rapid	rise	of	housing	finance	in	Bank	housing	interventions	translated	into	a	growing	share	of	its	private	sector	arm,	the	IFC,	in	the	Bank	Group’s	shelter	portfolio,	supplying	resources	(financial	and	otherwise)	to	extend	the	role	of	private	financial	institutions	in	developing	countries’	housing	systems	of	provision.			Finally,	the	national	articulation	of	World	Bank	policies,	in	general,	and	for	housing	in	particular,	is	uneven	across	time	and	space	and	varies	with	a	host	of	parameters,	including	the	nature	of	the	international	integration	of	a	country,	its	relationship	to	the	World	Bank	and	its	major	shareholding	nations,	specific	domestic	political	economy	configurations	including	those	bearing	on	the	role	of	housing	policy	domestically,	financial	sector	development,	etc.	Yet,	as	Pugh	(2001:	399)	stresses:	‘[a]lthough	individual	nations	develop	their	housing	and	urban	policies	within	their	own	political,	economic	and	cultural	conditions,	the	World	Bank	and	other	international	aid	agencies	have	had	powerful	impacts	in	promoting	and	applying	their	favoured	(and	changing)	theories	and	practices	of	housing’.	A	focus	on	the	World	Bank	then	allows	to	tease	out	essential	features	of	the	broad	contours	of	changes	in	shelter	policies	as	these	take	form	more	specifically	across	developing	countries.			
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This	paper	is	based	on	the	analysis	of	quantitative	and	qualitative	data.7	The	quantitative	data	were	collected	from	the	World	Bank’s	Operations	and	Projects	database	and	were	used	to	construct	a	complete	portfolio	of	World	Bank	housing	loans.	8	The	quantitative	data	were	combined	with	extensive	consultation	of	World	Bank	Project	Appraisal	Documents	which	provide	specific	details	of	each	loan	programme.	The	results	of	this	qualitative	data	collection	exercise	were	thematically	coded	to	reveal	patterns	and	to	assist	the	analysis	of	the	quantitative	data.	Loan	programme-specific	data	(both	quantitative	and	qualitative)	were	also	interpreted	through	critical	discursive	analysis	of	World	Bank	policy	documents	on	housing	and	urban	development	(World	Bank	1972a,	1974,	1975,	1982,	1993,	1994,	2000,	2003,	2006,	2010,	2015)	and	various	other	World	Bank	interventions,	including	working	papers,	published	articles,	websites,	conference	presentations,	etc.			The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	section	two	documents	how	the	Bank’s	original	involvement	in	housing	policy	in	the	early	1970s	was	subservient	from	its	inception	to	an	agenda	that	sought	to	expand	the	realm	of	markets.	Section	three	illustrates	how,	from	the	1980s	onwards,	the	Bank’s	original	promotion	of	private	housebuilding	was	re-oriented	to	become	focused	on	housing	finance.	Yet,	as	the	shift	to	housing	finance	accelerated,	the	distribution	of	Bank	shelter	loans	across	
																																																								7	I	would	like	to	thank	Ms.	Christina	Wolf	for	her	research	assistance.	8	More	precisely,	the	IDA	and	IBRD	components	of	the	World	Bank	housing	portfolio	were	constructed	drawing	on	the	World	Bank’s	Projects	and	Operations	dataset.	This	includes	information	on	all	of	the	World	Bank's	lending	projects	from	1947	to	the	present	and	can	be	accessed	at	http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/projects-portfolio.	The	IFC	component	of	the	World	Bank	Housing	related	portfolio	was	constructed	drawing	on	the	query	tool	provided	by	the	IFC	(http://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/$$Search?openform).	For	IFC	housing	operations	prior	to	2005	we	were	granted	access	to	the	database	underlying	World	Bank	(2006).		
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and	within	countries	moved	away	from	poorer	countries	and	poorer	sections	of	society	within	countries.	This	sat	uneasily	with	the	Bank’s	projected	poverty-reducing	mandate,	and	section	four	documents	how	a	‘participatory’	finance-led	approach	was	promoted,	now	extending	into	microfinance	for	housing.	Section	five	considers	the	response	of	Bank	housing	policy	to	the	events	unleashed	by	the	housing	finance	crisis	originating	in	large-scale	foreclosures	in	the	USA.	This	draws	attention	to	the	Bank’s	persistent	promotion	of	a	model	of	housing	provision	centrally	organised	around	housing	finance	and	commodification.	The	final	section	concludes	by	tying	the	paper’s	arguments	back	to	a	broader	set	of	themes.			
Public	Assistance	for	Private	Housing:	Celebrating	Self-Help	at	The	Bank		The	Bank	entered	the	field	of	housing	and	urban	development	in	the	early	1970s	as	part	of	then-President,	Robert	McNamara’s	drive	to	broaden	its	realm	of	interventions	to	include	social	policy	lending	over	and	above	its	traditional	focus	on	infrastructure,	industry	and	agriculture.	The	Bank	was,	however,	keen	to	maintain	its	conservative	image	as	a	bank	and	to	counter	accusations	that	social	lending	operations	risked	turning	the	institution	into	a	social	welfare	organisation	(see	Alacevich,	2009).	In	an	attempt	to	resolve	this	tension,	Bank	housing	interventions	were	characterised,	from	the	start,	by	a	focus	on	markets	and	a	commitment	to	private	housebuilding.			Figure	1	illustrates	how	sites-and-services	and	slum-upgrading	programmes	dominated	the	Bank’s	housing	interventions	during	the	1970s.	Sites-and-services	programmes	provide	land	on	which	individuals	construct	their	own	homes.	Slum	
11		
upgrading	involves	incremental	changes	to	slum	areas	through	the	provision	of	land	tenure	to	residents	and/or	upgrading	of	infrastructure	(water	supply,	sewerage,	electricity,	sidewalks).		These	type	of	shelter	interventions	were	explicit	in	their	aim	to	provide	public	assistance	for	private	housing	construction	and	sought	to	trigger	private	investment	through	dwellers’	‘self-help’	efforts	(World	Bank,	1972a,	1974,	1975).	They	were	guided	by	three	principles:	to	provide	low-cost	‘affordable’	housing	for	low-income	families;	to	recover	costs	from	beneficiaries	and	to	eliminate	public	subsidies	in	housing	provisioning;	and	to	create	replicability,	where	cost	recovery	would	demonstrate	profitability	for	the	private	sector	in	moving	downmarket	in	housing	provision	(World	Bank,	1993:	54).		
Figure	1.	World	Bank	(IBRD	and	IDA)	(public	sector)	shelter	portfolio	in	constant	million	2012	US$,	1971-2014	(July)	
	Source:	World	Bank	Project	Database,	excluding	disaster	relief.9																																																									9	The	numbers	for	‘Housing	Finance’	and	‘Sites	and	Services/	Housing	Construction’-related	projects	were	taken	directly	from	the	sectoral	allocation	provided	in	the	World	Bank	Projects	and	Operations	Database.	Housing	construction	projects	related	to	disaster	relief	operations	(e.g.	emergency	housing	reconstruction	of	earth	quake	damaged	region)	were	excluded.	The	numbers	for	‘Slum	Upgrading’	and	‘Housing	Policy’	were	constructed	manually	based	on	the	publicly	disclosed	online	documents	(staff	appraisal	document	or	project	information	document)	for	
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					The	first	Bank	housing	loan	was	for	a	sites-and-services	project	in	Senegal	(World	Bank,	1972b).	Acting	as	a	template	for	subsequent	loans,	it	sought	to	provide	urban	building	lots	together	with	facilities	in	the	cities	of	Dakar	and	Thies.	The	idea	was	that	prospective	tenants	of	the	sites	would	buy	their	lots	by	instalments	covering	the	cost	of	site	preparation,	interest,	management	and	water	service	charges.	Payments	would	be	made	over	15	years	at	an	interest	rate	of	7	per	cent	to	the	official	entity	responsible	for	low-income	housing.	They	would	create	an	investment	fund	for	the	continuation	of	a	national	sites-and-services	programme	after	the	completion	of	the	Bank	project	(p.	20).	By	accepting	the	funds	for	the	sites-and-services	project,	the	Senegalese	government	pledged	to	reduce	public	sector	construction	of	social	housing	as	well	as	its	general	budgetary	expenditures	on	housing	–	with	the	new	sites-and-services	strategy	aiming	to	be	self-financing	(World	Bank,	1972b:	7).10	Finally,	budgetary	limits	rather	than	professionally	designed	housing	standards	were	to	determine	methods	of	construction	(see	Ramsamy,	2006).		Underlying	this	type	of	housing	intervention	was	a	proposition	that	attributed	a	set	of	strengths	to	informal	sector	housing.	Public	assistance	was	to	build	on	these	
																																																								projects	classified	under	the	theme	‘Urban	Services	and	Housing	for	the	Poor’,	‘Urban	Planning	and	Housing	Policy’	as	well	as	‘Other	Urban	Development’.	The	author	can	provide	further	detail	of	how	data	were	categorised	upon	request.	All	projects	were	deflated	using	the	implicit	GDP	deflator	provided	UN	National	Accounts	Database	of	the	USA	in	the	year	of	the	project	board	approval.	10	See	also	Kumar	(2011:	667)	who	highlights	that	the	Bank’s	support	for	a	large	upgrading	and	sites-and-services	project	in	Madras	(India,	1977)	was	dependent	on	the	scaling	down	of	conventional	public	housing.	
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alleged	strengths	rather	than	‘to	replace	the	informal	sector	or	seeing	the	sector	as	a	“problem”’	(World	Bank	1975	quoted	in	World	Bank,	2006:	15).	This	echoed	earlier	celebrations	of	‘aided	self-help’	housing	that	had	been	promoted	by	international	institutions	intervening	in	housing	policy	from	the	early	1950s	onwards,	including	the	United	Nations,	the	U.S.	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID)	and	the	U.S.A.	Public	Housing	Department	(see	Harris,	1998;	Harris	and	Giles,	2003;	Ramsamy,	2006).	Harris	and	Giles	(2003:	168)	highlight	that	public	housing	was	never	favoured	across	these	organisations.	Instead,	an	important	role	was	ascribed	to	homeownership	and	private	provision,	both	of	which	had	strong	ideological	appeal	in	the	Cold	War	context.			This	ideological	appeal	combined	subsequently	with	a	set	of	analytical	propositions	celebrating	the	private	sector’s	capacity	to	respond	to	price	signals	in	a	housing	market	based	on	secure	title	(Mayo	et	al.,	1986).11	Reaffirmed	in	Malpezzi	(1994:	457),	the	assertion	was	that	while	real	estate	and	housing	markets	are	not	like	‘stylised	textbook	markets’,	they	remain	markets	that	‘can	and	do	reach	the	poor’.	This	depends,	however,	on	the	development	of	housing	finance	as	the	market	moves	downwards.	The	availability	of	finance	is	argued	to	stimulate	demand	for	housing	and	to	trigger	increases	in	supply.	Supply	constraints	are	understood	to	result	from	land	use	planning,	building	codes	and	standards	or	attempts	by	the	state	to	supplant	the	market	through	the	provision	of	publicly	
																																																								11	Jones	and	Ward	(1994)	illustrate	how	the	Bank	had	originally	been	sceptical	about	the	possibilities	of	free-market	solutions	for	urban	land	policy.	The	Bank	(1972a:	39)	was	explicit	on	the	inefficiencies	of	the	market	in	allocating	land	market	values.	Yet,	by	the	early	1980s,	a	belief	in	the	virtues	of	the	market,	also	for	land,	dominated.		The	emphasis	on	secure	title	further	anticipated	de	Soto’s	(2000)	proposition	that	title	allows	‘capital	locked	in	dead	assets’	to	be	unlocked	through	its	role	as	collateral	for	credit	for	businesses	to	be	set	up	by	home	owners.	See	Gilbert	(2002)	for	a	critique.	
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constructed	housing	(Malpezzi,	1990).	For	Bertaud	(1992:	53):	‘no	“scientific”	method	has	yet	been	developed	which	could	substitute	for	the	order	created	by	the	market’,	the	main	imperative	is	‘to	get	the	incentives	right’	(Malpezzi,	1994).			The	promotion	of	private	over	collective	provisioning	stood	in	stark	contrast	to	large-scale	public	sector	efforts	to	increase	the	housing	stock	across	a	range	of	developing	and	developed	countries	during	the	1950s	and	1960s.	These	reflected	a	recognition	of	the	inadequacy	of	the	market	to	address	acute	shortages	in	housing.	The	widespread	prevalence	of	market	failures	in	housing	bears	in	particular	on	the	potentially	perverse	effect	of	price	signals	on	housing	supply	originating	in	the	specific	nature	of	the	underlying	commodity,	land	(see	Baken	and	van	der	Linden,	1993;	Harvey,	2013;	Keivani	and	Warni,	2001).	Once	the	analysis	incorporates	land	as	a	fictitious	form	of	capital	deriving	expectations	of	future	rents	(see	Harvey,	2013:	28),	price	movements	can	elicit	perverse	supply	responses	when	the	anticipation	of	speculative	gains	(emerging	from	rising	prices)	becomes	an	obstacle	to	housing	delivery	(see	also	Desai	and	Loftus,	2012).	The	inequities	produced	through	the	market	can	become	exacerbated	when	combined	with	the	promotion	of	housing	finance	(see	Robertson,	2014).			Yet,	notwithstanding	the	shaky	analytical	foundations	underlying	the	case	for	private	provisioning	through	the	market,	the	Bank’s	entry	into	international	housing	policy	entrenched	self-help	and	private	provision	as	the	orthodoxy	of	international	housing	interventions	(see	also	Pugh,	1995).	Certain	forms	of	provision,	including	through	collective	forms	of	tenure	(such	as	offered	by	housing	associations	or	public	housing)	became	marginalised	in	favour	of	an	a-priori	
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commitment	to	owner-occupation	tenure	forms.	Further,	the	Bank’s	housing	projects	celebrated	the	principles	of	cost	recovery	through	user	pay,	lowering	standards	to	create	‘affordability’	and	replicability	of	demonstration	projects	by	the	private	sector.	As	such,	the	institution	facilitated	a	move	away	from	publicly	funded	provisioning	to	provisioning	determined	by	individual	capacity	to	pay	(through	user	charges	–	here,	paid	in	instalments).	With	time,	this	neoliberal	model	would	come	to	prevail	across	social	policy	more	broadly.12	It	would	itself	become	transformed	as	Bank	advocacy	and	policy	practices	became	more	closely	aligned	with	financialised	public	policy	imperatives	through	their	greater	focus	on	housing	finance.				
The	Turn	to	Finance			The	1980s	saw	important	changes	in	the	Bank’s	approach	to	housing.	The	Bank	rapidly	expanded	its	shelter	lending	with	this	increase	driven	by	the	rise	of	lending	for	housing	finance	(see	Figure	1).	Sites-and-services	or	slum-upgrading	projects	became	less	important,	as	the	Bank	argued	that	instead	of	concessional	loans	for	physical	interventions	(like	sites-and-services	programmes),	it	was	access	to	finance	that	would	improve	housing	conditions	(Buckley,	1999:	50).13			
																																																								12	Note	that	the	argument	that	housing	is	an	area	of	social	policy	in	which	neoliberal	reform	was	first	promoted	to	be	emulated	across	other	realms	of	social	policy	(including	health,	education,	pensions),	has	been	put	forward	for	OECD	countries.	For	Doling	(2012:	31),	following	Malpass	(2006),	housing	‘has	been	at	the	leading	edge	of	[welfare]	reform’	–	away	from	a	system	of	universal	services	funded	through	taxation.		13	Payne	(1984)	provides	an	alternative	account	of	sites-and-services	and	slum	upgrading	projects	and	emphasises	the	downward	raiding	by	middle-income	households	of	improved	sites;	the	inappropriate	geographical	location	of	the	sites;	and	the	adverse	effects	on	rent	affordability.		
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With	the	turn	to	finance	in	the	Bank’s	housing	paradigm,	housing	finance	came	to	account	for	nearly	half	of	Bank	shelter	lending	between	1982	and	1991,	up	from	a	negligible	share	of	less	than	2	per	cent	during	the	previous	decade.	Moreover,	over	80	per	cent	of	housing	finance	loans	were	channelled	to	(private)	financial	intermediaries	rather	than	to	public	sector	housing	authorities.	In	countries	that	relied	on	government	housing	programmes	(such	as	Korea,	Thailand,	Chile	and	Mexico),	a	central	objective	of	Bank	lending	was	to	refocus	the	activities	of	public-sector	housing	authorities	so	that	space	would	be	created	for	the	financial	sector	to	participate	in	the	mortgage	market	(Buckley,	1999).			Reflecting	the	themes	identified	in	the	introduction,	Bank	housing	finance	projects	aimed	to	replace	public	with	private	sector	finance	for	low-income	housing	by	incorporating	local	financial	institutions	in	the	provision	of	housing	finance	and	by	discouraging	the	use	of	subsidized	and	directed	credit	towards	housing	(World	Bank,	1993:	45).	The	idea	was	that	affordable	low-income	housing	would	be	supplied	on	a	full	cost-recovery	basis	through	the	market,	and	that	long-term,	sustainable,	finance	for	low-income	housing	would	be	secured	from	‘self-supporting	financial	intermediaries’	(World	Bank,	1993:	52).	The	Bank	advocated	for	this	shift	to	be	accompanied	by	a	reform	of	the	subsidy	regime	away	from	interest	rate	subsidies	towards	one-off	capital	grant	transfers.		The	shift	towards	housing	finance	at	the	Bank	succeeded	active	promotion	of	local	private	housing	finance	institutions	by	the	US	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID),	in	particular,	through	the	Housing	Guaranty	Program,	inaugurated	in	1961	(see	Pugh,	1995).	This	programme	provided	developing	
17		
country	housing	finance	institutions	access	to	US	capital	markets,	which	was	covered	by	a	100	percent	US	government	guarantee.	Its	projected	aim	was	to	increase	shelter	for	low-income	families	in	developing	countries	by	stimulating	local	credit	institutions	(GAO,	1995:	14)	and,	by	the	mid-1980s,	the	Housing	Guaranty	Program	constituted	‘by	far	the	largest	source	of	housing	assistance	to	developing	countries’	(Buckley	et	al.,	1985:	ii).	USAID’s	promotion	of	housing	finance	mirrored	the	fast	(re-)internationalisation	of	Northern,	and	in	particular,	US	banking	business	(see	Christophers,	2013),	and,	where	USAID	led,	the	Bank	followed.	The	promotion	of	‘self-help’	(or	individualised	shelter	provision)	in	international	housing	policy	combined	with	particular	financial	practices	that	were	to	gain	traction	as	the	internationalisation	of	Northern	banks	accelerated.14	This	happened	in	conjunction	with	a	set	of	financial	sector	reforms	in	developing	country,	including	financial	sector	deregulation,	privatisation	of	financial	institutions,	the	removal	of	obstacles	to	foreign	bank	entry,	and	capital	account	liberalisation.15	For	the	Bank,	financial	liberalisation	and	a	global	transformation	of	financial	systems	enhanced	the	prospects	for	rapid	development	of	private	housing	finance,	with	the	latter	projected	as	essential	to	finance	massive	housing	needs	in	developing	countries	(Renaud,	1999).		The	trend	towards	what	the	Bank	discerned	as	a	more	‘comprehensive’	approach	to	housing,	through	its	shift	towards	housing	finance,	was	consolidated	during	the	1990s	with	the	introduction	of	housing	policy	loans.	A	housing	policy	loan	typically	
																																																								14	See	also	Akyüz	(2014)	on	the	role	of	mortgage	finance	as	a	conduit	for	the	internationalisation	of	finance.		15	These	reforms	reflected	more	general	efforts	to	liberalise	developing	country	economies	through	the	Bank’s	structural	adjustment	programmes	(see	Van	Waeyenberge,	2006).	
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sought	to	strengthen	the	institutional	and	regulatory	environment	of	the	housing	market	and	to	increase	access	for	low-income	households	to	‘more	affordable	and	higher	quality	housing’	(World	Bank,	2010:	12).	Often,	such	a	loan	promoted	mortgage	lending	through	the	provision	of	loan	guarantees	with	the	aim	of	attracting	banks	to	lower-income	households	and	sought	to	restructure	existing	subsidy	programmes,	away	from	interest	rate	subsidies	towards	capital	grant	subsidies	(as	a	form	of	cash	transfer).		The	latter	would	facilitate	access	to	finance	by	serving	as	deposit.	Up-front	housing	subsidies	targeted	at	the	poor	would	combine	with	private-sector	suppliers	delivering	housing	through	the	market.			Figure	1	above	illustrates	how	housing	policy	loans	increased	fourfold	between	the	1980s	and	the	1990s.	This	accompanied	the	continued	importance	of	housing	finance	to	reach	55	per	cent	of	total	Bank	shelter	lending.	This	compared	to	the	near-halving	of	the	combined	share	of	slum-upgrading	and	sites-and-services	projects	between	1980s	and	the	1990s.		As	the	Bank	moved	into	housing	finance,	a	stronger	role	emerged	for	its	private	sector	affiliate,	the	IFC.	This	was	reflected	in	a	re-allocation	of	housing	finance	portfolios	across	the	World	Bank’s	affiliates	away	from	its	public	sector	towards	its	private	sector	arms.	Figure	2	illustrates	how	from	a	very	low	base	during	the	1970s,	the	IFC	was	set	to	become	the	dominant	World	Bank	Group	housing	player	(see	also	below).				
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Figure	2.	Total	World	Bank	Group	shelter	portfolio,	in	constant	million	2012	US$,	1971-2014	(July)	
	Source:	World	Bank	Project	Database	and,	for	IFC	projects	prior	to	1995,	the	database	underlying	World	Bank	(2006)	which	was	made	available	by	the	authors	upon	request.	Excludes	disaster	relief.			The	Bank’s	emphasis	on	finance	in	its	shelter	portfolio	affected	the	allocation	of	its	loans.	Larger	loans	became	the	norm	and	the	client	base	shifted	from	low-	to	middle-income	countries.	This	had	regional	implications	and	Bank	shelter	lending	to	Sub-Saharan	Africa	fell	rapidly	(World	Bank,	2006).	Within	countries,	the	finance	emphasis	in	shelter	programmes	implied	a	move	away	from	low-income	households	for	whom	finance	for	their	own	home	remained	persistently	out	of	reach.			
A	Brief	Interlude?		As	the	1990s	unfolded,	Bank	programmes	came	under	increased	scrutiny	in	particular	with	regard	to	their	impact	on	poverty.		In	response,	the	Bank	sought	to	revive	its	strategic	mission	focused	on	poverty	reduction,	including	in	shelter,	particularly	in	the	wake	of	the	negative	equity	implications	of	its	shift	towards	
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housing	finance	(see	above).	In	this	context,	it	launched	the	Cities	Alliance	(World	Bank/UNCHS,	1999)	with	the	aim	of	mobilising,	once	again,	resources	for	slum	upgrading	and	facilitating	participation	in	shelter	programmes.16			The	participatory	approach	implied	an	emphasis	on	the	role	of	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	or	community-based	organisation	(CBOs)	in	including	the	poor	in	the	finance-led	model	of	housing	provisioning	rather	than	that	it	entailed	any	fundamental	challenge	of	the	latter	(see	Otiso,	2003).	Under	the	ideological	banner	of	‘financial	inclusion’,	private	financial	institutions	were	to	move	downmarket	and	avenues	to	be	explored	to	integrate	formal	and	informal	finance	through	third	way	approaches	involving	NGOs,	community	banks	and	public	partnerships	(Datta	and	Jones,	2001:	334;	Gwinner	et	al.,	2005;	Mitlin,	1999;	Solo,	2009).	This	led	to	a	celebration	of	housing	microfinance	(see	Buckley	and	Kalarickal,	2005:	247).17		In	terms	of	the	Bank’s	shelter	portfolio,	the	share	of	slum	upgrading	in	Bank	lending	increased	during	the	2000s	(2001-2007)	compared	to	the	previous	two	decades	(see	Figure	1),	but	the	bulk	of	its	shelter	portfolio	remained	focused	on	housing	finance	(now	also	targeted	at	lower-income	households)	and	private-led	housing	provisioning	(including	through	private	sector	involvement	in	slum	upgrading).	Indeed,	close	inspection	of	appraisal	documents	of	projects	with	a	
																																																								16	This	resulted	in	initiatives	like	the	Slum	Upgrading	Facility	(created	in	2004)	and	the	Participatory	Slum	Upgrading	Programme	(created	in	2008).	See	Gruffyd	Jones	(2011,	2012)	for	a	critique.		17	Housing	microfinance	loans	are	not	necessarily	mortgages	but	consist	of	smaller	loans	with	the	aim	of	financing	incremental	improvements	of	housing	conditions.	See	Bateman	(2010),	Roy	(2012)	and	Soederberg	(2014b)	on	the	systemic	failures	of	microfinance	and	its	tendency	to	worsen	inequalities.		
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shelter	component	committed	between	2000	and	2007	reveals	the	persistence	of	the	following	imperatives:	titling	(land	tenure	regularization)	and	the	fostering	of	‘efficient’	land	markets;	access	to	housing	finance,	including	for	low-income	households	–	either	by	fostering	micro-credit	schemes	or	by	incentivizing	mortgage	providers	to	move	down-market	(e.g.	through	guarantee	schemes);	expanding	the	role	of	the	private	sector	in	the	delivery	of	affordable	housing;	and	subsidy	reform,	seeking	to	integrate	one-off	capital	grant	subsidies	in	finance-led	housing	provision	for	the	poor.			The	picture	becomes	starker	when	we	include	the	IFC,	which	is	active	in	a	range	of	housing	finance	activities	such	as	the	development	of	primary	mortgage	markets,	securitisation	and	mortgage	insurance,	and	offers	advisory	services	through	such	instruments	as	the	Global	Mortgage	Toolkit	and	the	Housing	Microfinance	Toolkit	(see	Gwinner,	2012).	Figure	3	reveals	how,	as	a	share	of	total	World	Bank	Group	activities,	including	IFC	operations,	housing	finance	grew	to	represent	over	60	per	cent	of	all	Bank	Group	shelter	activities	during	the	2001-2007	period,	while	the	combined	share	of	slum	upgrading	and	sites	and	services	fell	to	22	per	cent	over	the	same	period	(down	from	27	per	cent	in	the	previous	decade).	This	trend	reflects	the	rapid	rise	of	the	IFC	in	World	Bank	Group	shelter	activities,	with	its	share	reaching	nearly	50	per	cent	during	2001-2007.	While	the	combined	shelter	portfolio	of	the	public	sector	arms	of	the	Bank,	almost	halved	between	the	1990s	and	2000s,	the	portfolio	of	its	private	sector	affiliate,	the	IFC,	increased	fourfold	(see	Figure	2).		
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Figure	3.	World	Bank	Group	(IBRD,	IDA	and	IFC)	shelter	portfolio	across	different	types	of	intervention,	in	constant	million	2012	US$,	1971-2014	(July)	
	Source:	World	Bank	Project	Database	and,	for	IFC	projects	prior	to	1995,	the	database	underlying	World	Bank	(2006)	which	was	made	available	by	the	authors	upon	request.	Excludes	disaster	relief.		So,	while	the	poor	had	initially	been	excluded	from	the	finance-focused	shelter	approach,	the	Bank	sought	ways	to	include	them:	non-profit	and/or	CBOs	were	drawn	upon	to	facilitate	the	integration	of	the	previously	financially	unserved	into	the	realms	of	finance-led	shelter	provisioning.	The	aim	was	for	the	poor	to	be	integrated	into	the	pre-existing	finance-centered	shelter	paradigm,	now	extended	to	include	housing	micro-finance.			
Bank	Shelter	Policy	and	the	Global	Financial	Crisis		While	the	Bank	promoted	housing	finance	in	developing	countries,	developed	countries	witnessed	the	fast	expansion	of	mortgages	for	vulnerable	segments	of	society	following	rapid	restructuring	and	liberalization	of	mortgage	markets.	The	Bank’s	review	of	Thirty	Year	Shelter	Lending	remarked	on	the	way	in	which	‘competitive	and	affordable	housing	finance	[had	been]	growing	rapidly	in	both	
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developed	and	developing	countries’	(World	Bank,	2006:	41).	The	‘speed	at	which	market-based	housing	finance	has	spread	throughout	the	world’	astonished	the	authors,	who	observed	that,	since	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	‘the	world	changed	from	one	in	which	most	of	the	world’s	population	did	not	have	access	to	mortgage	finance	to	one	in	which	most	of	the	world’s	population	now	lives	in	countries	with	a	market-based	mortgage	finance	system	with	generally	affordable	terms’	(p.	xii).	The	Report	added	that	while	market-based	housing	finance	was	now	available	to	many	middle-income	people	in	the	world,	‘it	is	still	not	available	in	most	countries	or	for	the	poorest	people’	(p.	xii).	Here	a	role	for	the	Bank	emerged.	Together	with	the	broader	international	donor	community,	it	would	disseminate	the	lessons	of	‘how	to	develop	sustainable	housing	finance,	as	well	as	[to]	foster	housing	microcredit	institutions	which	could	bring	banking	services	and	forms	of	consumers	finance	to	millions	of	underserved	poor	people	around	the	world’	(p.	6).		At	the	time	of	the	publication	of	this	review	of	its	shelter	lending,	a	fast	increase	in	the	rate	of	foreclosures	in	low-income	areas	threatened	large	numbers	of	poor	people’s	access	to	shelter	across	various	USA	cities	not	too	far	from	the	Bank’s	headquarters.	This	had	followed	a	phenomenal	expansion	of	housing	finance	in	subprime	USA	housing	markets	where	loan	volumes	had	exploded	during	the	period	between	2004	and	2006	(see	Gotham,	2009:	365).	People	who	had	previously	been	considered	as	insufficiently	creditworthy	had	aggressively	been	targeted	as	potential	mortgagees	for	homes	that	were	often	in	poor	condition	(Dimsky,	2012).	By	the	end	of	2007,	nearly	2	million	people	in	the	USA	had	lost	their	homes	and	it	was	estimated	that	between	another	4	to	6	million	could	be	set	
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to	suffer	a	similar	fate	(Harvey,	2009:	1270).	By	mid-2008,	a	full-blown	global	financial	and	economic	crisis	had	been	unleashed,	triggered	by	the	failure	of	these	low-income	households	to	keep	up	with	the	payments	on	their	debt-financed	homes.	Through	securitisation	of	residential	mortgages	and	the	fast	take-up	of	these	financial	instruments	by	various	financial	and	non-financial	institutions	across	the	world	(see	Schwartz,	2012),	these	defaults	provoked	a	global	financial	crisis	and,	as	the	latter	transformed	into	the	Great	Recession,	caused	enormous	losses	in	the	real	economy	across	the	world.	Further,	the	subsequent	large-scale	rescue	efforts	of	the	financial	institutions	by	the	public	sector	caused	a	fiscal	crisis	of	the	state	in	a	number	of	countries,	which	led	to	drastic	spending	cuts	being	implemented	through	austerity	packages	(see	Ortiz	and	Cummings,	2013).	At	the	heart	of	this	threat	to	the	world	financial	system	and	of	the	consequent	implosion	generated	by	the	Great	Recession	stood	the	failure	to	provide	decent	and	affordable	housing	for	low-income	households	in	the	USA	outside	of	a	framework	of	mortgage	finance	for	homeownership	(see	Bratt,	2012).			This	raises	the	issue	of	whether,	and	if	so	how,	the	Bank’s	housing	approach,	which	centres	on	housing	finance	for	privately	provided	homes,	was	affected	by	the	crisis.	I	argue	that	while	the	dramatic	events	provoked	by	the	collapse	of	the	US	sub-prime	market	received	some,	if	minimal,	attention	in	Bank	housing	discourse,	Bank	housing	policies	in	practice	displayed	little	sign	of	change.	On	the	contrary,	the	promotion	of	housing	finance	and	of	private-sector	led	provisioning	were	consolidated	in	Bank	housing	programmes	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis.	At	the	same	time,	the	scholarly	arguments	in	support	of	such	programmes	remained	inadequately	organised	around	efficient	market	arguments.		
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	As	the	global	financial	and	economic	crisis	took	full	course,	the	World	Bank	(2010)	issued	its	new	urban	strategy	document.	This	followed	the	publication	of	the	2009	World	Development	Report,	Reshaping	Economic	Geography	(World	Bank,	2009).	Both	documents	bear	on	shelter	policy.		Neither,	however,	present	significant	departures	from	the	Bank’s	previous	positions	on	housing.	World	Bank	(2010:	16)	concedes	that:		 the	enabling	market	approach	was	far	too	sanguine	about	the	difficulties	in	creating	well-functioning	housing	markets	where	everyone	is	adequately	housed	for	a	reasonable	share	of	income	on	residential	land	at	a	reasonable	price,			but	the	text	continues	to	assure	its	readers	that	the	‘general	principles	of	enabling	markets’	remain	valid.	These	must,	however,	be	combined	with	‘sensible	policies	and	pragmatic	approaches	to	urban	planning	and	targeted	subsidies	for	the	urban	poor’.	For	the	Bank,	key	areas	bearing	on	housing	that	continue	to	pose	the	greatest	challenge,	then,	include:	planning	for	markets,	public	land	management,	property	rights	and	housing	finance	(p.	16).	The	development	of	primary	mortgage	markets	and	the	promotion	of	microfinance	remain	at	the	heart	of	its	shelter	paradigm.	The	argument	proceeds	that	pro-poor	policies	require	partnerships	with	NGOs,	CBOs	and	the	private	sector	(p.	10).	And	where	slum	upgrading	remains	significant,	the	private	sector	has	an	important	role	to	play	(p.	10).	Throughout	the	entire	document	there	is	one	(inconsequential)	reference	to	the	global	financial	and	economic	crisis	(on	p.	24).	
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	Turning	to	the	2009	World	Development	Report,	a	general	framework	advocating	for	the	need	for	efficient	well-regulated	markets	(for	land,	labour,	goods	and	finance)	continues	to	prevail	and	various	commentators	have	denounced	the	Report’s	flagrant	failures	to	engage	with	the	realities	driving	the	global	financial	crisis	(see	Fine,	2010;	Harvey,	2009,	2013).	In	the	context	of	housing,	the	emphasis	remains	on	owner-occupation	as	the	preferred	form	of	tenure,	the	development	of	residential	mortgage	markets	in	developing	countries,	and	an	enabling	role	for	the	state	(World	Bank,	2009:	206).			Further,	the	Bank	published	Housing	Finance	Policy	in	Emerging	Markets	(Chiquier	and	Lea,	2009)	in	2009,18	once	more	extolling	the	benefits	of	housing	finance.	The	book	discusses	the	USA	subprime	crisis	in	the	introductory	chapter	in	less	than	a	page-and-a-half,	to	ignore	its	implications	in	the	rest	of	the	text.	Indeed,	the	subprime	crisis	‘does	not	contradict	the	goal	of	expanding	access	to	housing	finance’	to	the	poorer	segments	of	the	population	(p.	xxxviii),	but	lays	bare	what	happens	when	this	is	pursued	without	a	‘sound	regulatory	regime	supported	by	the	necessary	risk-management	infrastructure’.	For	Chiquier	and	Lea	(2009)	developing	country	policy-makers	can	avoid	the	subprime	mortgage	mistakes	simply	through	good	prudential	risk	management.	There	are	no	fundamental	lessons	to	be	drawn	from	the	subprime	crisis	not	in	the	least	regarding	the	flawed	integration	of	financial	and	property	markets.	Yet,	where	public	circuits	for	housing	finance	still	exist,	these	have	been	plagued	–	without	intention	of																																																									18	In	various	Bank	publications	this	edited	volume	is	referred	to	as	a	2006	Bank	publication,	which	possibly	was	the	initial	timeframe	for	its	scheduled	release.	I	speculate	that	early	signs	of	the	subprime	mortgage	implosion	in	the	US	may	have	delayed	publication.		
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hyperbole	or	parody	–	by	‘high	levels	of	defaults,	non-targeted	lending	crowding	out	private	sector	competitors,	ineffective	and	regressive	subsidies,	inefficiency,	and	politically	motivated	lending’	(p.	xliii).	Unsurprisingly,	the	role	of	the	state	remains	one	of	enabling	the	development	of	housing	finance	markets	(p.	xliv).		Moving	on	to	Bank	shelter	lending	practices,	lending	for	housing	finance	represents	the	largest	category	in	the	Bank	Group	shelter	portfolio	for	the	period	between	2008	and	2014	(see	Figure	3).	Moreover,	its	share	increased	in	the	Bank	public	sector	portfolio	during	the	crisis	period	(2008-2014)	and	now	accounts	for	nearly	half	of	all	Bank	public	sector	shelter	lending.	This	compares	to	the	previous	period	(2001-2007)	when	it	had	dipped	to	one-third	of	combined	IBRD/IDA	shelter	lending	(see	Figure	1).	In	addition,	Table	2	(see	Annex)	lists	all	housing	finance	projects	committed	by	the	Bank	(IBRD/IDA)	between	2008	and	2014	and	reveals	the	pervasiveness	of	micro	housing	finance.	This	includes	loans	for	capacity	building	in	micro	lending,	to	refinance	microfinance	institutions,	to	develop	new	products,	and	to	strengthen	regulation	and	supervision	in	the	sector.		While	housing	finance	dominates	Bank	public	sector	shelter	lending	during	the	crisis	period,	Table	1	also	reveals	how	shelter	projects	other	than	those	for	housing	finance	remain	characterised	by	a	pervasive	emphasis	on	private	sector	provisioning,	now	increasingly	pursued	through	PPPs.19	The	table	was	compiled	on	the	basis	of	close	scrutiny	of	the	programme	documents	of	IBRD/IDA	projects	
																																																								19	See	Bayliss	and	Van	Waeyenberge	(2017)	on	how	this	turn	to	PPPs	corresponds	to	a	more	general	search	by	institutional	investors	for	stable	inflation-protected	yields	that	are	offered	through	various	forms	of	infrastructure	PPPs.		
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that	are	classified	as	housing	policy,	slum	upgrading	and	sites-and-services/housing	construction	(i.e	all	IBRD/IDA	shelter	lending	except	for	housing	finance).	In	total,	30	projects	had	been	committed	across	these	three	categories	during	the	crisis	period,	19	of	which,	all	listed	in	Table	1,	promoted	the	private	sector	in	shelter	or	urban	infrastructure	delivery.20		 	 	 	
Table	1.	Private	sector	involvement	in	IBRD/IDA	housing	projects	except	for	housing	finance,	2008-2014. 	
Housing	construction	and	slum	upgrading	 Provision	of	trunk	infrastructure	PPP	for	low-income	housing	in	Productive	and	Sustainable	Cities,	Development	Policy	Loan	(DPL),	Columbia	2012	 Ghana	Greater	Accra	Metropolitan	Area	project	2013:	PPP	in	sanitation.	PPP	for	land	and	housing	development	in	National	Macroproyectos	Social	Interest	Program	Project,	Columbia	2011.	 Optimization	of	Lima	Water	and	Sewerage	Systems	2011	through	a	PPP.	Private	sector	participation	in	low-income	housing	production,	Brasil	Rio	de	Janeiro	Metropolitan	Urban	and	Housing	Development	2011.	 Benin	Cities	Support	Project	2013:	increase	private	sector	involvement	for	provision	of	municipal	infrastructure.	PPP	for	delivery	of	serviced	land	and	housing	in	Kenya	Informal	Settlements	Improvement	Project	(KISIP)	2011.	 Urban	and	Water	Development	Support	Project,	Cameroon	2010:	PPP	in	urban	water	services.	Jamaica	Integrated	Community	Development	Project	2014:	development	of	a	strategy	to	incorporate	the	private	sector	and	NGOs	in	low-income	housing	development.	
Maputo	Municipal	Development	Program	II,	2010:	PPP	in	infrastructure	and	public	service	provision.	Low-Carbon	DPL	Loan,	Mexico	2010:	subsidy	to	low-income	households	to	allow	purchase	of	houses	from	private	providers.	 Rep.	of	Congo,	Water;	Electricity	&	Urban	Development	Specific	Investment	Loan,	2010:	PPP	in	urban	water	supply.	Integrated	Urban	Development	Project,	Yemen	2010:	development	of	partnerships	between	public	and	private	sectors.		 Local	Urban	Infrastructure	Development	Project,	Niger	2008:	promotion	of	private	sector	participation	in	urban	public	works.	Housing	and	Communal	Services	Project,	Russia	2008:	promotion	of	private	sector	participation	in	housing	and	municipal	services.	 		Brasil	Municipal	Adaptable	Program	Loan	(Teresina	Enhancing	Municipal	Governance	and	Quality	of	Life	Project,	2008):	involvement	of	private	sector	in	housing	regularisation	in	slum	and	other	low-income	housing	areas.	Priority	Infrastructure	Investment	Project,	Vietnam	2008:	promotion	of	private	sector	involvement	in	housing	for	the	poor.	Land	Administration	and	Management	Project,	Montenegro	2008:	promotion	of	private	sector	(and																																																									20	The	total	project	count	excludes	disaster	relief-related	projects	as	well	as	additional	financing	on	previous	projects.	
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international	tendering)	in	real	estate	cadastre	development.	Second	Land	and	Real	Estate	Registration	Project,	Kyrgyz	Republic	2008:	promotion	of	land	and	real	estate	markets.		Source:	World	Bank	Project	Appraisal	Documents	(various)			Finally,	while	Figure	2	indicates	that	IFC	housing	activities	slowed	down	after	their	fast	expansion	over	the	previous	period	(having	quadrupled	between	2001-2007,	see	Figure	4),	they	continue	to	account	for	a	significant	share	of	total	World	Bank	Group	shelter	activities,	standing	at	just	under	half	(46	per	cent)	for	the	2008-2014	period	(see	Figure	2).			
Figure	4.	IFC	Housing/Shelter	Portfolio,	1971-2014	(July)	in	constant	million	2012	US$.	
		Source:	IFC	Project	Database	and,	for	IFC	projects	prior	to	1995,	database	underlying	World	Bank	(2006)	which	was	made	available	by	the	authors	upon	request.				In	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis,	the	IFC	has	sought	explicitly	‘to	help	resuscitate	an	important	asset	class	that	has	fallen	out	of	favour	with	some	investors’	(IFC,	2013:	2).	It	pledged	to	increase	the	supply	of	mortgage	finance	through	its	
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investments.	Figure	4	also	indicates	how	the	involvement	of	the	IFC	in	housing	construction	projects	has	strongly	grown.	This	includes	two	types	of	activities.	On	the	one	hand,	the	IFC	extends	loans	to	or	takes	equity	stakes	in	private	real	estate	developers	that	often	have	been	tasked	by	governments	with	the	development	of	affordable	housing	through	PPPs.	On	the	other,	IFC	involvement	in	housing	construction	includes	its	investments	in	the	private	production	of	building	materials	(in	particular	cement).21		The	World	Bank	Group	has	hence	become	involved	across	the	chain	of	housing	provision	in	the	promotion	of	privatised	finance-led	provisioning,	as	it	extends	credit	and	takes	equity	positions	in	housing	finance	institutions,	providers	of	affordable	housing	and	building	materials.	The	combination	of	housing	finance,	including	microfinance	schemes	to	serve	poorer	borrowers	with	PPPs	in	the	provision	of	housing	for	the	poor	renders	the	privatisation	of	housing	provision	for	the	poor	comprehensive	across	various	dimensions	of	a	housing	system	of	provision.		An	archetypal	neoliberal	and	financialised	system	of	provision	is	consolidated	in	the	joint	promotion	of	finance	on	the	demand	side,	multiple	providers	on	the	supply	side,	and	cash	transfers	(here	in	the	form	of	capital	grant	subsidies)	to	act	as	safety	net.			A	particular	set	of	analytical	arguments	drives	the	persistent	commitment	to	finance-led	commodified	provisioning	in	Bank	discourse	and	practices.	While	these	
																																																								21	And	as	multinational	corporations	capture	the	opportunities	of	such	a	trend,	global	cement	producers	team	up	with	housing	microfinance	providers	to	promote	loans	for	the	purchase	of	their	cement	(see	Lafarge	Holcim	2016).		
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started	off	with	the	rejection	of	collective	forms	of	provisioning	through	state-funded	interventions	in	favour	of	individualised	self-help	forms	of	provision,	the	analysis	quickly	became	driven	by	general	market-efficiency	type	arguments.	These	persisted	unperturbed	by	recurring	housing	market	failures	to	improve	access	to	housing,	which	originate	in	the	intrinsic	nature	of	land	and	the	scope	for	speculative	value	extraction	attached	to	it.	These	failures	were	worsened	with	the	integration	of	financial	and	housing	markets	and	the	internationalisation	of	these	circuits.	Yet,	the	alleged	efficiencies	of	the	private	sector	in	the	delivery	of	shelter	as	an	essential	service	have	achieved	canonical	status	in	argument	bearing	both	on	housing	demand	and	supply.	This	is	perhaps	best	epitomised	in	a	2014	World	Bank	Working	Paper	(Collier	and	Venables,	2014)	which	celebrates	a	market-led	housing	policy	through	a	revisionist	and	deeply	flawed	historical	account	of	housing	policies,	projecting	a	combination	of	finance	and	title	as	magic	bullets	to	address	massive	shelter	inadequacies	through	market	enablement.22			An	urgent	need	persists	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	impact,	and	in	particular	the	equity	effects,	of	the	continued	promotion	of	financialised	shelter	practices	in	the	developing	world.	This	needs	to	proceed	on	the	basis	of	a	concrete	understanding	of	how	global	trends	are	mediated	in	a	specific	context	where	specific	institutions,	structures	and	agents	interact	to	produce	housing	outcomes.	
																																																								22	Collier	and	Venables	(2014)	forms	the	backbone	of	Buckley	et	al.	(2015),	which	sums	up	the	proceedings	of	a	meeting	of	high-level	representatives	of	various	international	and	national	agencies	involved	in	housing	policy.	The	report	expresses	concern	regarding	recent	government-driven	mass	housing	initiatives	and	reiterates	arguments	against	government-led	large	scale	upgrading	of	the	housing	stock	in	developing	countries	in	favour	of	private	sector	initiatives	(including	through	participatory	slum	upgrading).	This	is	despite	evidence	that	the	provision	of	basic	infrastructure	to	informal	settlements	that	are	upgraded	can	amount	to	three	times	the	cost	when	extended	to	large	formal	housing	developments	(UN-Habitat	2011).	
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Such	an	investigation	could	benefit	from	the	recent	revival	of	the	systems-of-provision	framework	in	the	context	of	housing	(see	Bayliss	et	al.,	2013;	Robertson,	2014)	combined	with	explicit	attention	to	international	factors	bearing	on	a	particular	system	of	housing	provision	in	a	specific	country	(see	Owusu,	2011).	It	would	assist	in	redefining	the	international	policy	spectrum	to	include	ways	to	decouple	shelter	provisioning	from	the	hasards	of	finance	(see	also	Harvey,	2009).		At	the	same	time,	certain	countries	that	have	been	traditionally	reliant	on	Bank	assistance,	in	particular	low-income	countries,	have	experienced	fast	growth	during	the	fifteen	years	and	have	seen	a	strong	interest	from	new	actors	such	as	China.	This	has	presented	new	opportunities	in	terms	of	shelter	policy.	This	has	led	in	certain	instances	to	the	(re-)emergence	of	supply-driven	approaches	to	mass	housing	provision.23	While	these	seek	to	capture	benefits	of	scale	and	scope	as	they	effect	large-scale	increases	in	the	housing	stock,	they	have	been	marred	by	sets	of	problems,	not	in	the	least	through	their	lack	of	affordability	for	the	lower-income	strata	of	the	population	(see	Croese	et	al.	2016;	Tipple	2015).	This	points	to	the	persistence	in	national	housing	policies	of	an	attachment	to	owner-occupation	as	preferred	tenure	form	in	combination	with	housing	finance	to	facilitate	access	to	such	tenure	form,	rather	than	that	the	commodity	and	financialised	logic	are	abandoned	in	attempts	to	resolve	the	massive	shelter	inadequacies	in	the	developing	world.				
Conclusion	
																																																								23	See	Croese	et	al.	(2016)	for	a	discussion	of	the	mass	housing	programmes	in	Angola,	Ethiopia,	Namibia	and	South	Africa	initiated	in	the	2000s.	
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	This	paper	examined	the	nature	of	the	World	Bank’s	approach	to	housing	policy,	with	a	particular	interest	in	an	assessment	of	whether	its	previous	focus	on	housing	finance	to	overcome	shelter	inadequacies	in	the	developing	world	was	somewhat	tempered	as	a	result	of	the	dramatic	fallout	of	the	GFC.	The	paper	pursued	a	historical	approach	and	such	a	deconstruction	of	the	Bank’s	housing	discourse	and	policy	practices	allowed	to	illustrate	how	the	Bank’s	original	involvement	in	housing	was	heavily	imbued	by	what	would	later	become	common	neoliberal	principles	of	welfare	provisioning:	commodification	and	the	withdrawal	of	collectivity	in	favour	of	individual	forms	of	provisioning.	Further,	it	was	demonstrated	how	the	particular	way	in	which	this	agenda	was	implemented	changed	as	Bank	practices	shifted	to	reflect	a	greater	focus	on	housing	finance	during	the	1980s.	This	shift	to	housing	finance	in	the	Bank’s	shelter	portfolio	was	consolidated	during	the	1990s	and	was	propelled	forward	by	the	rising	importance	of	the	Bank’s	private	sector	affiliate,	the	IFC,	while	the	Bank’s	response	to	mounting	criticism	of	its	approach	around	the	turn	of	the	millennium	(unsurprisingly)	led	it	to	accommodate	lower-income	households	into	an	unchanged	finance-led	approach	through	recourse	to	financial	inclusion	and	microfinance	practices.	Finally,	the	GFC	failed	to	dislodge	the	Bank’s	neoliberal	and	financialised	bias,	wasting	a	rare	opportunity	to	broaden	the	policy	spectrum	to	include	alternative	forms	of	shelter	provision	beyond	those	organised	around	finance-led	commodified	provision.			The	analysis	of	the	Bank’s	approach	to	shelter	over	time	served	a	number	of	purposes.	First,	it	highlighted	the	distinct	features	of	neoliberal	approaches	to	one	
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aspect	of	social	provisioning,	here	housing,	as	promoted	by	a	large	international	(and	public)	financial	institution.	Second,	it	charted	how	the	nature	of	a	World	Bank	promoted	housing	agenda	changed	as	underlying	financial	conditions	changed.	Third,	it	examined	the	nature	of	the	scholarship	deployed	in	support	of	Bank	housing	policy.	Fourth,	it	teased	out	contradictions	and	tensions	generated	by	World	Bank-promoted	housing	policies.	And,	finally,	it	documented	the	persistently	neoliberal	(and	financialised)	nature	of	the	World	Bank’s	attempted	resolution	of	these	tensions.	As	such,	a	focus	on	World	Bank	housing	policy	provided	a	prism	through	which	the	trajectory	and	the	mutating	nature	of	a	neoliberal	housing	agenda	in	the	developing	world	was	examined	anchoring	the	paper	within	broader	debates	both	on	the	role	of	international	financial	institutions	in	development	as	well	as	the	nexus	between	housing,	neoliberalism	and	financialisation.			
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Annex	 		
Table	2.	Prevalence	of	housing	micro	finance	in	IBRD/IDA	projects	with	housing	finance	component,	2008-2014.				 Country	 Project	Title	 Year	 Housing	Micro	Finance		(HMF)	Component	India	 India	Low-Income	Housing	Finance		 2013	 Capacity	building	(development	of	new	financial	products,	loan	standards,	risk	management	tools	and	financial	literacy	and	consumer	protection)	and	refinancing	(by	the	National	Housing	Bank)	of	qualified	primary	lending	institutions	that	provide	low-income	housing	loans.	These	include	microfinance	institutions.	Nigeria	 Housing	Finance	Development	Program		 2013	 HMF	component	aims	to	support	the	development	and	piloting	of	new	and	emerging	formal	HMF	products	and	demonstrate	a	sustainable	business	case	for	these	activities.	
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Columbia	 National	Macroproyectos	Social	Interest	Program	Project	 2011	 NONE	Uganda	 Financial	Sector	Development	Policy	Loan	1		 2011	 General	development	of	housing	finance	market,	including	for	micro	loans.		Morocco	 Sustainable	Access	to	Finance	Development	Policy	Loan	 2010	 General	aim:	to	expand	further	access	to	financial	services	to	underserved	sectors	‘while	preserving	financial	stability’.24	This	includes	improving	regulation	and	supervision	in	the	microfinance	sector	(p.	2).	The	loan	includes	funds	for	a	new	housing	guarantee	fund,	Damane	Asskane,	covering	guarantees	for	housing	loans	for	applicants	with	low,	irregular	or	informal	source	of	income.25		Tanzania	 Housing	Finance	Project	 2010	 Component	2	of	the	loan	focuses	on	the	development	of	housing	microfinance.		Egypt	 Affordable	Mortgage	Finance	Development	Policy	Loan	 2009	 Includes	addressing	the	regulatory	framework	for	micro	(housing)	finance.26	Latvia	 Financial	Sector	Development	Policy	Loan	 2009	 NONE	Mexico	 Private	Housing	Finance	Markets	Strengthening	Project	(loan	to	the	Sociedad	Hipotecaria	Federal,	with	guarantee	from	Mexican	government)	
2008	 To	expand	access	to	lower-income	groups,	including	through	housing	micro-credits.27	
Montenegro	 Land	Administration	and	Management	Project	 2008	 NONE	(titling	project)	Kyrgyz	Republic		 Second	Land	and	Real	Estate	Registration	Project	 2008	 NONE	(titling	project)	Source:	World	Bank	Project	Database,	Project	Appraisal	Documents	(various)	Notes:	This	table	lists	all	IBRD/IDA	projects	with	a	housing	finance	component	committed	between	2008-2014	(and	which	exceeded	US$1	million	in	commitment).			
																																																								24	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/10/16/000333037_20121016232915/Rendered/PDF/ICR23100P1172000disclosed0100150120.pdf,	p.	1	25	‘Poor	people	are	expected	to	remain	the	main	beneficiaries	of	this	scheme,	including	slum	households	for	which	a	specific	guarantee	scheme	has	been	designed	(FOGARIM-VSB).		Launched	in	July	2004,	the	national	Moroccan	program	Villes	Sans	Bidonvilles	evolves	from	the	wide-sweeping	goal	of	eradicating	all	slums	by	2012	through	making	home	ownership	affordable	for	the	urban	poor’	(paragraph	48	World	Bank	2012	Implementation	Completion	Report).	26	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/09/03/000334955_20090903014626/Rendered/PDF/483050PGD0P1121e0only10R20091021411.pdf	27	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/07/12/000356161_20130712120425/Rendered/PDF/ICR28030ICR0Me0Box377377b00PUBLIC00.pdf	
